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ABSTRACT 
This essay considers the consequences of  recent debates on realism in epistemology and ethics 
on political philosophy, and for political action. It is argued here that reference to the good in 
political discourse is both unavoidable and recommendable. Further, it is argued that 
considerations of  the role of  the good in individual and political action suggest that a political 
community has a relative ontological substantiality, half-way between those affirmed by 
individualistic and organicist views. 
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1. Realism and political philosophy 
 
Discussions about realism are a characteristic trait of  the last few decades of  
philosophical debate in the analytical tradition.1 These debates have opened the 
way to a return of  realism in many areas of  philosophy and in different 
philosophical contexts.2 Starting in the areas of  metaphysics, epistemology and 
theory of  cognition, discussions about realism have reached into philosophy of  
cognition, theory of  action, theory of  normativity (Dancy 2003) and ethics (Brink 
1989; Smith 1994; Audi 2013). 
The fields of  theory of  action, theory of  normativity, and ethics are closely 
linked to political philosophy. Hence, discussions about realism should have 
important implications for political philosophy. These implications, however, are 
generally overlooked, with a few recent exceptions (Audi 2011; Groff  2013). In 
political philosophy, the leading paradigm is still dependent on the social contract 
                                                            
1 Brock and Mares (2007) offer an overview of  the debate. A paradigmatic example of  the 
centrality of  problems related to realism in contemporary philosophy is the work by Hilary 
Putnam. See De Anna (2001). 
2 Maurizio Ferraris has spoken of  a “new realism” as a characteristic feature of  contemporary 
philosophy at large (2012). His claims opened an interesting debate in Europe: cf., for example, 
Ferraris and De Caro (2012) and Gabriel (2012, 2013). 
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tradition, and on the conception of  human action which goes with it. According to 
this conception, human action is directed towards ends set by our psychological 
makeup, and reason has a purely instrumental role in reaching those ends. The 
political implication is that we can be free in a negative sense: i.e., to the extent 
that we have no internal or external constraints jeopardizing the attainment of  
our ends.3 Political power is hence always a burden to our freedom, although it 
might be a necessary one. These views about individual freedom and political 
power have important implications concerning the reasons which keep us together 
in a political community and, hence, on the ontological consistency of  the 
political community. 
This conception of  human action has marked the social contract tradition 
from the times of  Hobbes and is rooted on the naturalist metaphysics 
underpinning that tradition: it accounts for human action without the need to 
introduce “queer” properties in the world, e.g. values, norms, teloi, goodness, 
ideas, etc. This view still prevails in the contemporary leading paradigm of  
political philosophy due to the great influence of  the work of  scholars such as 
John Rawls.4 It still recommends itself  in the political arena, since it promises to 
grant political neutrality and to avoid all conflicts: it grants to each individual the 
possibility of  acting according to his or her conception of  the good, by trumping 
any attempt to offer an objective characterization of  the good, which might have 
a claim to be imposed on everyone. On this view, the implication is that 
discussions about the good in political contexts (and by that I mean both in 
political philosophy and in political practice) should be avoided. Any claim about 
the good – it is said – would have disastrous, totalitarian implications, if  brought 
into the political arena. Debates about realism, hence, are acceptable all the way 
up to moral philosophy, but should not be allowed to enter the realm of  political 
discourse. The point is that political life is meant to bring about peace and 
agreement, by mediating among different perspectives of  the good. In order to do 
this – it is usually thought – references to the good should be limited as much as 
possible, in order to avoid the possibility that theoretical disagreement might 
result in practical disagreement and ultimately in social conflict. 
                                                            
3 On this acceptation of  the term ‘negative freedom’ and on its role in the social contract 
tradition see (Castellano 1993, 25-43; Ferry 2002). 
4 The claim that Rawls is committed to a negative conception of  freedom could seem dubious. 
He openly claims (1971, 201 and ff.), indeed, that he wants to remain neutral about what 
freedom is, and that he accepts both conceptions of  freedom (negative and positive) described 
by Benjamin Constant. However, Constant redefines the classical terms ‘positive freedom’ and 
‘negative freedom’ from the political point of  view, on the basis of  assumptions about a 
conception of  action and of  practical reason (one typical of  his time) which takes individual 
freedom to be merely the absence of  internal or external constraints. Rawls follows Constant in 
this, as it is clear from the pages which immediately follow the reference to him. 
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In this essay I would like to counter this implication, by making some 
considerations about the relevance of  realism in action theory and in ethics for 
political philosophy. I will claim that the premises which are normally taken to 
ground the above implication are not warranted: considerations about action 
theory and normative theory suggest that – contra the leading paradigm – our 
practical reason is not purely instrumental (section 2) and political power is not 
necessarily a constraint to our freedom (sections 3). In my view, this calls for a 
revision of  the ontological status of  political communities (section 4), and 
suggests that discussions about the good are not only innocuous, but even required 
for the sake of  social peace (section 5). 
 
 
2. Human action, reasons and normative realism 
 
What is a human action? By action I mean the control over one’s causal powers 
which one can be understood to own and be held responsible for. As Elisabeth 
Anscombe (1957) famously noted, an action is such if  there is a person who owns 
it. For someone to own an action means that there is someone who may respond 
by giving a reason to the question “why did you do that?” For example, a person 
gives some money to a beggar on the street and we ask him “why did you do it?”; 
he can answer, for example, “because he’s hungry.” I say that he can answer so, 
because sometimes the person interrogated could lie and hide the reasons that she 
had. 
We can grasp the full meaning of  this definition of  action if  we think of  cases 
where one does something, but that doing cannot be said to be, strictly speaking, 
one’s action. Suppose that, without realizing that there is a friend of  mine behind 
me, I turn around and accidentally slap her on her face. “Why did you slap her?,” 
someone might ask. “I did not slap her,” I would answer, “I just bumped onto her 
accidentally.” In these cases, we would also refuse responsibility for what 
happened: to the question “why have you hurt her?” we would answer “It was not 
my fault.” Further, the person affected could not be angry to us, at least as far as 
she is rational. 
It follows that a human being does what he does as human being (and not as a 
mere body that occupies space and moves) because he is guided by reason, and, 
therefore, is rational. Of  course the amount of  rationality that we need to claim 
that one owns certain actions and is responsible for them is pretty minimal, to use 
a term introduced by Robert Audi (2001, 50). Rationality is minimal in this sense: 
When we say that a person is rational in order to stress that she is ‘in herself ’, that 
she does not do things that are out of  control, as when, for example, she acts 
under the causal influence of  narcotics. We can imagine in such a case that when 
she wakes up – someone else can ask “is she rational now?”. Rationality, in this 
sense, admits of  weaker or stronger degrees to which a person or a belief  can be 
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rational. This definition of  rationality can simply involve consonance with reason, 
or it can involve a stronger commitment to finding out truth and doing good. This 
distinction between degrees of  rationality intersects with my argument to follow , 
but I will not have the space to discuss these intersections here. I am persuaded, 
however, that the notion of  reason for action that I am employing applies across 
the board, even in the case of  minimal rationality. 
Reasons for actions have an objective side and a subjective side. The objective 
side depends on the fact that reasons purport to give a description of  states of  the 
world. In the example above: “he is hungry”, i.e. a description of  a state of  the 
world is given as a reason to explain an action. This state of  the world is not by 
itself  a reason, however, and – besides other things – it must be seen as a reason by 
a subject in order to be such. 
A key feature of  the instrumentalist view about practical reason which 
underpins the leading paradigm of  political philosophy, as mentioned in section 
one, is that it takes this subjective facet of  reasons as proof  that a reason is the 
conjunction of  an objective element – a belief  about states of  affairs – and a 
subjective element – typically a desire concerning the relevant states of  affairs 
(Davidson 1963). This leads to the view that our reason can rule our beliefs, 
without thereby being necessarily able to affect our agency: only if  a relevant 
belief  is also in place, can reason affect our agency. This is why reason is only 
instrumentally relevant in satisfying desires, which are set independently from it. 
The desire-belief  analysis of  reasons is particularly appealing to 
naturalistically oriented philosophers, since it seems to account for many morally 
relevant aspects of  our experience, without committing one to the existence of  
moral facts or normative features of  reality. Desires – i.e., perfectly natural 
features of  our psychology – would explain normative features of  our behaviour. 
Hence, this account of  reasons is normally accompanied by some form of  moral 
anti-realism. This view is now far from gaining a large consensus (Dancy 2003, 
Vogler 2002), however, there are still important grounds for complaint, as follows: 
If  the view were correct, one could have a certain belief  about a moral judgment, 
e.g. that “action a is mandatory,” and not have a reason not to do a. Indeed, 
reasons – under these assumptions – would be conjunctions of  beliefs and desires, 
and one could lack the desire to a. This finds itself  in tension with a feature of  our 
moral discourse, namely that moral beliefs give us reasons to act even when we 
lack the corresponding desires. 
The shortcoming of  the desire-belief  account of  reasons for action seems to 
me to suggest that the fact that reasons have subjective and objective facets 
should not lead to an analysis which breaks reasons for action into an objective 
and a subjective part. Rather, in analyses of  reasons for action, subjective and 
objective aspects should be kept together. Let us see how this can be done. 
The fact that a reason for an action has a content and, then, describes states 
of  the world, entails that reasons for actions can, on the one hand, be adequate or 
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inadequate, and, on the other hand, are objective. They may be adequate or 
inadequate, since their contents can be true or false: things can be as they suppose 
or not: “Why have I given him some coins? Because he was hungry.” But the 
beggar could have not been hungry, and in this case the propositional content of  
the reason would be false. Furthermore, reasons are objective: whether the beggar 
was hungry or not does not depend on the feeling or the beliefs of  the agent who 
thought he had those reasons for acting, but on how things were in reality. Even if  
the fact of  wanting something is given as a reason by an agent, that wanting is a 
reason only in so far as that agent really had that want, and this is an objective 
state of  the world, no matter how questionable grounding a reason on that fact 
might be. 
So far I have claimed that the reasons which explain our actions can motivate 
us, and have truth-evaluable contents, i.e. they are in a way objective. This does 
not imply that all we do is rational, since our practical rationality can fail in two 
primary ways. Firstly, agents do not always know the truth values of  the contents 
of  their reasons: one may have a partial view of  the situation, and thereby believe 
true contents to be false, or the other way around. In cases of  this sort, one’s 
reasons may turn out to be inadequate. For example, one might think one has a 
normative reason to do what one does, but in realty, is not justified. Secondly, the 
reasons which explain one’s action and moves one’s will might fail to really justify 
one’s choices: one’s explanatory reasons may be motivating but fail to be 
normative (Audi 2010). Indeed, the justification one gives for one’s actions may be 
bad reasons, and so may not really justify these actions. “Why did you steal the 
bag from the lady?” Answer: “The lady seemed quite rich; I was hoping to find a 
rich haul.” All this suggests that an agent is an agent only if  she is rational (if  she 
is guided by reasons, and therefore the effects of  her movements are not purely 
random), but also that the rational capacity of  a human agent is in many ways 
limited. 
Above, I said that reasons may be adequate or inadequate, and that this 
depends on the fact that their content can be true or false. This assumes that the 
reasons are not simply their contents. What are they? The above example shows 
that a person can express her reason to act by uttering a sentence as an answer to 
a why-question. This suggests that a reason is a function of  its content 
determined by the particular situation in which a sentence expressing that 
content can be uttered (although, the sentence does not have to be uttered: often 
we have reasons to do what we do, even if  we do not express them verbally, either 
aloud or in an introspective form). The content of  a reason represents a state of  
affairs, which, in the eyes of  the agent, justifies her action. This fact justifies, I 
believe, considerations about the conditions of  its possibility, both on the 
subjective and on the objective side. A state of  affairs can be seen as a reason by 
an agent, since that state of  affairs is recognized as having some order – i.e., as 
something positive and good – but it is seen as an order or an asset that is deficient 
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in some ways and that can be improved by the agent herself. A reason for an 
action, then, expresses a way in which that action realizes a good, the possibility 
of  which is recognized by the agent in reality. In our example, the utterance of  
“he is hungry” can be seen as giving reason if  these conditions are met: (i). There 
is an individual, i.e. a human, which is recognized as having an intrinsic order 
(e.g., being a living organism, with a digestive apparatus needing food) and being 
worthy as such; (ii). The individual is recognized as being deficient in his order 
(e.g., lacking the food he needs); (iii). The agent realizes that he has the power to 
complete the lack of  order in that individual. 
To say that the end of  human action is a good is not to support an overly 
optimistic outlook on human nature, but only to recognize a feature of  our agency 
which is compatible with our fallibility: the good sought by the agent is such in his 
view, but he can fail in the recognition of  the good for the two kinds of  limitations 
of  our rationality seen above. The claim that the agent seeks a good by 
recognizing and completing an order which is already partially realized in reality 
can help us explain better the sources of  our limitations. Indeed, the information 
on the basis of  which an agent recognizes an order in reality and a way of  
improving it may be defective in ways which undermine the normative reasons one 
thinks that one has. For example, I believe that something is a living organism 
which needs food, but it is really just a sophisticated robot which only needs 
electric charge. Similarly, one might be defective in their subjective response to the 
lack of  order to be found in reality and to the possible ways of  improvement. So 
one might recognize that someone else needs food, and see providing him some 
spirits as the best way to make up for that. In both cases, one does not have the 
normative reasons one thinks one have. 
So far I have highlighted connections between reasons for action, goods, and 
normativity. These notions can be interpreted in a moral and in a non-moral sense. 
There might be reasons, goods to be achieved, and normative grounds for 
incompatible directions of  action. We have reason to follow, achieve and consider 
only all things considered reasons, goods, or normative grounds, respectively. 
Furthermore, not all all things considered reasons are moral: I may have a reason 
to go for a walk (e.g., it may be just that I desire it), without that being a moral 
reason. A moral reason is one that is seen by the agent as requiring an obligatory 
response from him, as from any other rational agent who happens to be in a 
situation similar in relevant ways. Where the border between the realm of  non-
morally relevant and morally relevant reasons lies depends on what the agent sees 
at good, and, consequently, it might or might not be justified. 
The conclusion we have reached shows that human action is in a sense 
intrinsically normative: not in the sense that it can be always explained by reasons 
which are normative, but in the sense that it can be explained only by reasons 
that the agent fallibly beliefs to be normative. This leads to a form of  normative 
realism: the grounds of  normativity – a partial order and ways of  implementing it 
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– can be found in reality. However, this is an epistemically moderate sort realism: 
the good as such can only be recognized from the point of  view of  an agent and 
practical rationality of  agents is fallible, as we have seen. Let us now look at 
practical fallibility in further depth. 
 “Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor,” as Ovid wrote: our practical 
fallibility is a common human experience of  all times. The point is that our 
practical rationality is limited, and the study of  its limitations is one of  the major 
contributions of  contemporary moral philosophy. Firstly, there are the epistemic 
limitations we have already considered above: an agent always has a practical 
vision of  the situation in which she acts, and facts which elude her recognition 
could be relevant for her choices. Secondly, our practical reason is not just a form 
of  reasoning, but it is a network of  cognitive and volitional capacities which 
include both reasoning and insight. Often, we just see what is good or bad, 
without having to reason about it. The interaction between these faculties offers 
several occasions for failure. Thirdly, we often have different reasons suggesting 
different courses of  action and must choose between them. Our choice can be less 
than fully rational because of  our epistemic limitation, but also because of  the 
influence that our desires and our habits exercise on our deliberative processes. 
Virtue theory is relevant in this connection: our habits are virtues when they 
enable reliable rational deliberative processes in us, and shape the structure of  our 
desires in ways which are conductive to recognizing and following good reasons for 
action. Habits are also important in shaping our insights about good and evil, and 
in establishing the weight we give to different reasons in our deliberative processes. 
Fourthly, and finally, we are free to act against our best judgments, even if  our 
tendency to rationalize our bad deeds suggests that thus acting violates and forces 
our nature in important ways.5 
 
 
3. Politics as something we do 
 
The limitations of  our practical rationality suggest important ways in which our 
agency is connected to, and depends on, the communities to which we belong. 
First, communities contribute to the constitution of  our moral identity; second, 
communities can help our moral flourishing; third, communities can be burdens to 
our flourishing. Let us consider these points in turn. 
Communities contribute to the constitution of  our identity in two main ways 
(De Anna 2012b, Ch. 3 and 4). First, our practical rationality depends on our 
                                                            
5 This fourth point is only available to compatibilists and libertarians about free will. I think 
that an acceptable conception of  free will must lay in one these two families of  positions, since I 
believe that deterministic conceptions of  action fail to account for our experience of  freedom 
and for our moral experience: two sections of  our experience which are too basic to be bracketed 
away. I will not argue for this point here, however. 
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linguistic abilities, and our linguistic abilities are shaped by community-based 
linguistic norms. Furthermore, pragmatics has shown many ways in which our 
community-normed language can create rituals and social facts which are both 
contents of  our practical deliberations and grounds for our practical judgments. 
Second, our habits, our virtues and our vices, are largely influenced by the 
education we received and, even as adults, by the social environment in which we 
live. However communities shape our moral identities, they do not determine them: 
our practical rationality and our freedom are constitutive of  us in ways that a 
community cannot change.  
Communities can help us to improve our practical rationality for at least two 
reasons. First, they furnish us with rules for interpreting moral reality which are 
the result of  long traditions and often survived because they were good-conducive. 
This puts us in a better position than we would be in if  we had to start moral 
reasoning from scratch. Second, in communities we have to confront views of  the 
good different from our own, endorsed by others: this forces us to press our 
epistemic limits and to improve our outlook of  reality, and pushes us to develop 
our reasoning abilities for the sake of  being able to justify our choices to others 
(Mill 1859, Ch. 1). 
Communities can, however, also be burdens to us: if  we grow up in an abusive 
context we might develop quite distorted conceptions of  what is good, and even in 
adult life, by being embedded in vicious social contexts, we might end up 
acquiring habits which put our capacity to recognize and respond to good reasons 
at risk. 
The political community has a special role – among other communities – in 
shaping moral individuality. We can distinguish various kinds of  community, 
depending on the purpose for which they exist and for which humans form or 
remain in them. The political community is different from other communities, 
since it does not exist for a particular purpose: the family is formed for the sake of  
everyday life (procreation and mutual support), an entrepreneurial society for the 
sake of  a certain business, a sports club for practicing a certain sport. The 
political community, however, has no particular purpose of  this kind. Why does 
the political community exist? We can note that by being in the political 
community we can do, at our best, anything we want to do. The political 
community helps us to excel in what we want to do. This means that it helps us to 
be better agents. The purpose of  the political community, therefore, is to help us 
to develop our practical rationality, and it survives and keeps existing to the 
extent that, at least in a limited way, it fulfils this function (De Anna 2012a, Ch. 
2). 
These claims are relevant both at the descriptive and at the normative level. 
What the political community does, and what it must do, is perfecting us. This is 
not a conceptual confusion, but it is a necessary consequence, once we have 
abandoned the Humean assumption that human action is reducible to the 
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combination of  a desire and a belief. Since the political community is the result of  
our actions, it can only be understood as a good, a reason we have to stay together. 
The aim of  perfecting its members in practical rationality is therefore what causes 
a political community to be what it is, and what allows us to identify it as an 
“object.” Being a functional object, the political community has an end which is 
both the principle of  identity and the normative ground for the choices that the 
community needs to make. Hence, its aim is also a criterion for assessing a 
community. 
This account of  the political community also explains a fact of  our 
experience: the political community is superordinate to other communities, since 
it assesses whether and how they carry out their tasks, and rules them. All 
communities are outputs of  our actions. Since the political community aims at 
allowing us to do what we do at our best, it will also help us to make the most of  
the actions with which we constitute other communities. Hence, the political 
community also perfects other communities. To do this, it will have to take a 
stand about what is good for each of  them, and it will have to rule them. 
Authority is the mode through which the political community achieves its end 
(Green 1990). By “authority,” I mean that the political community cannot use 
mere power, contra a common assumption of  the social contract tradition: its 
ability to act is based on the recognition, on the part of  its members, that it 
pursues a good and that it is reliable. Hence, authority is based on consent, seen as 
a rational recognition of  a good, not as an option for any project whatsoever. This 
does not mean that every individual will agree with any decision of  the authority. 
Rather it means that, although we can often be critical of  the institutions and 
their decisions , we continue to think that, for the role they have taken in the 
course of  their history, they are still worthy of  our trust and that it is more 
rational to follow their prescriptions than to ignore or dismantle them. Authority 
is therefore not followed because it uses force (although sometimes it will also have 
to do that) and its exercise is always morally qualified, the criteria being whether 
it achieves a good that the community can share and whether there is a normative 
reason for its decisions. The choices of  authorities can be good or bad. 
To say that the political community should help its members to recognize and 
pursue the good does not mean that it should always enforce what seems good on 
those who have a decision-making function, for two reasons. First of  all, even 
those who are in a position to make a decision that has political significance have 
limited practical rationality. For this reason, they should always doubt their 
understanding of  what is true and good. Second, those who hold political decision-
making roles should not fully enforce all the goods that they recognize, since they 
must also consider the beliefs and expectations of  the members of  the community 
in which they have a role of  authority, for three reasons. First, they shall only 
impose those goods that can be recognized as such, at least by a (non-necessarily 
numerically) significant section of  the community, otherwise authority collapses. 
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Second, if  an objective good radically transcends the possibility of  recognition of  
the members of  the community, given their epistemic level, imposing it would de-
humanize those on whom it is imposed. Human action is based on the ability to 
act freely and rationally. To impose an end on someone’s action when one 
genuinely cannot recognize that good as such, despite one’s sincere efforts, would 
amount to forcing one to act against what one sees as good and that kind of  action 
would be to treat them as non-human. Third, even in the case of  agents who want 
to do what they recognize as evil – i.e., who want to use their freedom in dubious 
ways, political authority must sometimes tolerate evil, in matters of  no great 
moral weight: the growth of  moral identity can sometimes require the experience 
of  pain and the sense of  defeat or loss that follows from moral failure. Accepting 
minor evils can lead to greater goods. 
These observations on the nature of  the political community suggest that the 
community is something we do, and something we have a reason to do, i.e. 
something which we see as good for us, since it helps us to reach a practical good 
which is such for all of  us, i.e. the common good. The recognition and the pursuit 
of  that good cannot be decided in the abstract, but only in the historical 
circumstances of  the life of  a community, i.e. from the point of  view of  the agents 
who give rise to the community or keep it existing by consenting to it. The upshot 
is that a certain plurality of  visions of  the good can and should be accepted, 
according to the concrete historical circumstances of  the community. The 
structure of  the community, i.e. the features of  all the individuals who constitute 
it and the arrangement of  the kinds of  humans that thereby shape it, define the 
range and the scope of  the common good which a political community can 
recognize and seek. 
 
 
4. Moderate political realism 
 
We have seen that the notion of  a good is fundamental in shaping the choices of  
individual agents and in constituting the communities that individuals give rise to, 
including the political community. This epistemically modest moral realism marks 
a considerable distance from the leading paradigm of  political thinking, according 
to which political societies are aimed only at peace, seen as the end of  conflict, i.e. 
at allowing people to satisfy at the highest possible degree their desires – or 
whatever pro-attitudes they might have – under the assumption that those desires 
are the rulers of  reason, and are not ruled by it. By contrast, the role that I have 
attributed to the good in human action suggests a quite different outlook 
concerning the relation between individuals and political communities. Political 
communities turn out to be more ontologically consistent than the leading 
paradigm suggests. Moral realism leads to a form of  political realism. 
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Given the role of  the good in shaping individual action and, hence, political 
consent, when political authority takes a position on a certain issue, such a 
commitment is seen as a moral judgment by the members of  the community, and, 
thereby, it will influence their perception of  the good and their moral reasoning. 
Similarly, when authority does not take a stand about a certain moral issue, even 
its silence will have a moral role, since it will be read – for example – as the 
statement that all alternative courses of  action are morally on a par with this one. 
The silence of  authority, then, is not neutral, but it has moral significance. 
This conclusion indicates that there is a quite strong tie between the political 
sphere and the individual sphere. The nature of  the political community suggests 
various ways and different forms in which individual choices can influence the 
political sphere. In general it can be observed that, if, as we have seen in the last 
paragraph, the end of  the political community is the good and the true, and if, as 
we have seen in the second paragraph, the goal of  the individual is the good, then 
every human action is, in principle, politically relevant and therefore has a 
political dimension. This does not mean, of  course, that every human action must 
conform to a political decision or, still less, that it must depend on one: it just 
means, on the one hand, that each action can be evaluated by political authorities 
and, secondly, that the mere fact that an action is performed calls for a public, 
political recognition of  its legitimacy. 
We could say that the moral identity of  an agent is shaped (though not 
determined) by his membership to a community, and primarily to a political 
community. Moral individuality is politically significant because the actions to 
which it gives rise, in their individuality and particularity, question, challenge and 
test the notion of  the good that is recognized by the political community through 
the functions of  its legitimate authority. 
This link between the individual and the public or communitarian dimension 
is also realized in other forms of  community. Think of  the linguistic community at 
large. The linguistic act with which one makes a promise is effective if  it follows a 
certain ritual: for example, the person who performs it should pronounce the 
words with a serious tone, looking at his interlocutor in the eyes, without laughing 
or making strange gestures in the meantime. Now suppose that I want to 
accomplish effective speech acts in order to produce a promise, but I do not follow 
the ordinary ritual. Of  course, my actions will not deviate too much from the 
original ritual because otherwise my gestures would be ineffective. But suppose 
that I begin to perform acts that are intended to be valid only if, while I utter 
certain ritual words, I jump up and down. Among my friends, the rumour might 
spread that I give that meaning to this kind of  acts and they may begin to use the 
same ritual. My new ritual might eventually be accepted by the entire community 
(and thereby acts which follow it will be accepted in the eyes of  all members of  
the community) only if  my new rule is universally accepted, that is if  it gives 
birth to a recognized alternative of  the rite of  promising. My claim that one can 
Realism, human action and political life. On the political dimension of  individual choices 
 
672 
 
promise in a certain way, in short, cannot be limited to my actions, but must have 
a “public” recognition. 
The case of  the political community is different from that of  other 
communities, due to the specific features of  the political community: its direction 
to a good pertaining to all. An action done by a member of  a political community 
has a claim to be recognized as good or at least neutral by the whole community. 
We have seen that political authority may have to tolerate evil actions for the sake 
of  avoiding greater evils. This silence can be read in an ambiguous way by the 
members of  the community. Nevertheless, when one wants to do X, one thinks 
that X is good or neutral, and one cannot therefore be satisfied if  the authority 
lets someone do X for the sake of  mere tolerance: she expects the recognition of  the 
goodness or neutrality of  X. For this reason, the acceptance of  a plurality of  
mutually incompatible positions about the distinction between what is morally 
neutral, what is morally obligatory or permissible, what is tolerable and what is 
not tolerable will always be an unstable position, which calls for a solution to the 
epistemic and social problems which sometimes justify it. In short, political 
authority cannot but compromise itself  about truth and about the good. 
The upshot of  this is that by deciding to regulate a certain kind action or not 
to regulate it, authority cuts spaces of  privacy from the realm of  the public. The 
realm of  privacy is then defined by the range of  actions which are considered 
morally indifferent or tolerable. The realm of  the public is that concerning 
matters in which authority judges that actions of  members must be regulated. 
The sphere of  moral indifference is filled with reasons that an agent is not obliged 
to respond to. The sphere of  the tolerable is filled with reasons that an agent is 
obliged to respond to, although political authority judges that it is not reasonable 
to impose that obligation. The sphere of  the public is filled with reasons that 
every rational agent has an obligation to respond to and such that authority 
judges necessary to enforce a response to them. 
As we have seen at the end of  the second section, the border between the 
domains of  morally relevant and morally neutral reasons depends on the 
perception of  the good of  each individual agent. Given that the political 
community is something done by individual members in the ways considered in 
section three, the border between what is permissible, what is tolerable, and what 
must be publicly enforced cannot be set a priori: it depends on the perception of  
the good of  the members of  the community, on their shared traits – that is, their 
shared character and habits, and on the notion of  a common good that they, as a 
political community, have reached at a certain point of  their historical trajectory. 
This is not to say that such a distinction has no criteria of  correctness: as we have 
seen, authority can persist and strengthen itself  to the extent that it can reliably 
conduct its members to the good. The point, however, is not trivial. It suggests 
that we cannot expect that communities with different existential trajectories 
recognize the same borders between the private and the public, between what is 
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morally indifferent or at least tolerable, and what is to be ruled. Like the good, an 
explanation of  an action can only be recognized from the point of  view of  the 
agent, and just as an agent’s response depends both on his rationality and on the 
features of  his moral identity, so the common good of  a community can only be 
practically recognized from the point of  view of  the community, i.e. from the 
point of  view of  its members. The moral identity of  the members, however, is 
shaped, although not determined, as we have seen, by the political community in 
which they live. We can now add that habits and moral individualities are not 
homogenous within a community: any community has an internal articulation of  
groups and sub-communities which is the result of  its historical development. In a 
way, the articulation of  a community constitutes its individuality. Just as human 
individuals can recognize the goods to reach towards with their actions only from 
the points of  view of  their moral individualities, so a community can only 
recognize the common good which can be accessed from the point of  view of  its 
articulation. 
The conclusion we have reached constitutes a sort of  moderate political 
realism: it takes political communities to have a certain degree of  ontological 
consistency. The tie which binds the community together is the fit between the 
habits and the moral individualities of  its members and the articulation of  the 
community. This marks an important difference from the view of  society 
supported by the leading paradigm: according to that view, individuals are 
independent atoms united only by the need for protection and by the desire to 
maintain the highest possible degree of  independence. Virtually any set of  
rational beings can be bound together in that way. By contrast, my view purports 
that only humans suitable for a certain community can find a place where they fit 
in its articulation. 
The suggested realism, though, is moderate. By this I mean that the unity of  
the political community cannot be overstated. The bond is not such that it can 
ontologically determine its members. One is what one is – i.e., a rational agent 
with certain individual features – even if  one does not remain in one’s community. 
According to the point of  view that I am suggesting, a strong form of  an organic 
conception of  political entities, such as Hegel’s, makes the opposite mistake to the 
leading paradigm. 
An example is useful here to illustrate the half-way ontological status of  
political bonds that I propose. In our current multicultural societies, we often 
encounter people who have experienced abandoning their motherland and starting 
a new life abroad, very often in remote parts of  the world. The very existence of  
migrants shows that the ontological status of  a person is not determined by her 
motherland(s). Migrants can go somewhere else and live a rich and fulfilling life, a 
life which is very often – and this is usually what they hope when they leave – 
much better than the life they could have expected in their motherland(s). 
However, no matter how well integrated they are in their new countries, many 
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experience the feeling that they cannot be fully understood by their new fellow 
citizens, and that they cannot fully understand them either. Often they search for 
ways of  socializing or living a public life which remind them the typical modes of  
their homelands. It is as if  their habits and their ways of  responding to situations 
of  life were tuned for a certain form of  social and political life, and they keep 
looking for it. As is typical for human affairs, this is not universally true, and 
there are cases of  people who cannot fit in their homeland and find relief  in other 
political communities. But as usual, in human affairs, generalizations hold 
statistically, not absolutely. Furthermore, the very fact that someone does not fit 
in one’s homeland and has to flee shows that a fit is required for a functional and 
successful relation between individuals and political institutions. Hence, even if  
we are not ontologically made to be in our communities, in a sense we are shaped 
by them and for them. 
 
 
5. The good in political discourse 
 
I started off  by pointing out that, according to the leading paradigm, talking 
about the good in political contexts should be avoided, because it can fuel 
disagreement, whereas politics should seek the end of  conflict. This normative 
implication is normally grounded – among others – on two premises: (i). That the 
ends of  human actions are not ruled by reason, but by desires which are 
potentially divergent and irreconcilable across different people; (ii). That political 
societies are formed for the sole sake of  maximizing desire satisfaction. In the 
above sections I have supported a view of  human action and the political 
community which denies the views of  practical reason and political society 
proposed by the leading paradigm. This takes the ground from under the feet of  
the normative implication about talking of  the good in politics. My points, 
however, set the stage for two other steps, one descriptive and one normative: I 
would like to claim that talking about the good in political discourse is both 
unavoidable and, further, welcome. 
Ought implies can. So, we ought not to speak about the good in political 
contexts only if  this can be avoided. However, the points I have made above about 
individual action and the political community suggest that we cannot avoid 
speaking about the good in political contexts. Hence, it is not true that we ought 
not to speak about the good in political contexts. This means that the normative 
implication of  the leading paradigm on which I have been focusing from the 
beginning of  this essay is not only ungrounded, it is also false. One might wonder: 
why do the points I made above about individual action and the political 
community suggest that we cannot avoid speaking about the good in political 
contexts? Well, recall that individual human agents aim always at what they see 
as good, and political communities aim always at what they can see as the 
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common good. This implies that even if  we do not use the word ‘good’ – or one of  
its derivatives or analogues – we still speak about the good when we speak about 
human action, individual or political. By not using the world ‘good’ – or one of  its 
derivatives or analogues – we do not avoid really speaking about the good, but we 
speak about it in disguise. 
An apt example can be found in the leading paradigm itself. That paradigm 
promises to be neutral about the conceptions of  the good that individual citizens 
embrace, and affirms that political discussions should focus on other issues. At the 
same time, however, it cannot really allow that all conceptions of  the good which 
can possibly be held by citizens be equally acceptable, since those which deny 
equal respect for the opinions of  all should be ruled out from the spectrum of  
reasonable, acceptable positions. This claim, however, conceals a commitment 
toward a certain conception of  the good, according to which a certain good is 
ranked as the highest, and as setting criteria for the evaluations of  actions: this is 
the conception according to which the human will, or human freedom (seen as the 
possibility of  realizing at the highest possible degree one’s desires or pro-attitudes) 
is the highest good. My contention here is not that this conception is wrong, it is 
simply that it is a conception of  the good, even if  it is under disguise. My last, 
normative point is this: if  commitment and reference to a conception of  the good 
in political contexts is unavoidable, then political philosophy and political practice 
should openly discuss the good in individual and political action, rather than in 
disguise. There are at least three simple reasons which support this normative 
claim. First, as Mill pointed out (1850, Ch. 1), when a statement, a theory, or a 
worldview, albeit true, is passed through a processes of  public scrutiny and 
discussion, the rational warrant and the conviction of  those who hold it are 
strengthened. Openly discussing the good reinforces confidence in it. Second, when 
conceptions of  the good belonging to different political stake-holders are not 
openly discussed, unwarranted alliances can be formed, and these are likely to lead 
to unexpected breakdowns, which are likely to ruin trust and cohesion among 
citizens. Third, when supporters of  different conceptions of  the good argue openly 
in favour of  their views, they might eventually come to realize – when that is the 
case – that they lack knock-down arguments which might convince all fellow-
citizens of  their views. When this happens, members of  the community can be 
more tolerant toward positions different from their own, since they are able to 
recognize that other people hold views different from theirs, and do so rationally , 
not as a result of  bad faith or hidden agendas. Hence, trust and collaboration will 
increase. 
The leading paradigm does not question the legitimacy of  talking about the 
good in political contexts for mistrust of  these reasons, but rather for the fear that 
such a talk could be dangerous and increase social conflict. I would like now to 
argue that this fear is totally unwarranted. Certainly, the fear would be warranted 
if  the assumptions of  the leading paradigm that we have discussed were true, i.e. 
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if  practical reason were just an instrument for the satisfaction of  desires which are 
quite arbitrary and criterion-less, and if  the political community only had the role 
to stop, through its power, the conflict which would certainly arise among citizens 
entirely guided by potentially irreconcilable desires. Indeed, in this case, if  
everyone were to bring their own personal conceptions of  the good as objective 
and real matters that everyone else should recognize and approve, conflict would 
increase. 
I have countered those assumptions, and the views that I have proposed in 
their place promise very different results. I have suggested that human reason is 
not just the instrument for the satisfaction of  criterion-less desires, but the 
capacity to recognize an already partially realized order in reality and to find 
ways to improve it. I have also contended that the political community is not just 
an expedient to anesthetize conflict, but it is a way to reach a common good 
sharable by all members of  the community. If  this is so, the political discussion of  
different perspectives of  the good is not likely to increase disagreement, but to 
overcome it. Furthermore, disagreement would be overcome not by the imposition 
of  arbitrary solutions to all parts through the exercise of  mere power, but by the 
rational agreement on a sharable perspective on the good reached through a 
discussion concerning what is good. 
The key point of  the argument is that reasons have a content which 
presuppose the recognition of  an order partially realized in reality and of  possible 
ways of  implementing it. Disagreement originates in the limitations of  our 
practical rationality, which I mentioned in section 2. The partiality of  the point 
of  view of  each individual, and the constraints which might bias our responses to 
the normative reasons which we might otherwise recognise, play the fundamental 
role in generating disagreement. Unlike desires which are deft to reason, however, 
our different perspectives on the good can, in principle at least, be reconciled 
through rational processes. The first step would be to reach a sharable description 
of  the facts which constitute the landscape in which a decision has to be taken. 
My point is not that once all the facts are spelled out properly practical 
disagreement will necessarily be overcome. Such a thesis would not be supported 
by my arguments. The account of  practical reason given in section two is 
consistent with the possibility that two subjects might disagree about what 
reasons they have, even if  they agree on all the relevant facts. Indeed, I claimed 
that there is a subjective aspect of  reasons, and different subjects may respond in 
different ways to the same facts. If  one could show that human subjects are all 
akin in their metaphysical structure such that they will respond in similar 
manners when facing the same situations a stronger case for the possibility of  
agreement could be made. But I have not said anything to support that thesis in 
this essay. My argument here, however , does not rest on such a strong thesis. In 
order to reach my conclusion, it is enough to claim that discussions about the good 
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increase the chances of  overcoming disagreement in respect to strategies in which 
reference to the good is avoided. 
My point is that if  we do not try to rationally assess and compare our 
different perspectives on the good, the disagreement among our views will 
certainly be maintained, and all the sacrifices which will have to be made of  the 
parties in order to give equal satisfactions to everyone, will be taken ultimately as 
unjust frustrations of  one’s desires. On the other hand, if  we try to assess and 
compare our perspectives on the good, it is at least possible that some of  us can 
correct our judgments about order in a direction leading to agreement. Even in 
less fortunate cases, when one does not revise one’s own response to normative 
reasons which lead to disagreement with others, realizing that others have 
grounds for their reasons will make accepting this alternative reason as an 
obligation more tolerable. Hence, political practice should involve also a rational 
assessment and a discussion of  the perspectives on the good supported by the 
members of  the community. 
It can be concluded that the debates about realism in epistemology, action 
theory, normative theory and ethics have important consequences on political 
philosophy too, and that a careful study of  latter is needed.6 
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